Marriage, regarded as a legal contract, and divorce as its breakup were similarly affected by official procedures. The future husband and his father-in-law agreed on a contract and if a divorce occurred, the father-in-law was entitled to satisfaction.
The contract made between suitor and the father of the expected bride stipulated a price for the maiden's hand. She received the sum given to the father. If the marriage did not produce children then the price the groom had paid for his wife was returned to him upon on her death, if it had not been returned previously.
Lack of children was not the only reason for returning the price paid for the wife; her death could create a refund. Once married, the girl became a full member of her future husband's family. If he died, she would marry one of his brothers or, if he lacked brothers, one of his near relatives. If these conditions did not take place, her father returned all his rights over her, and gave back all the presents that she had received except those consumed.
Conversely, if the girl died, and her intended husband did not want to marry one of her sisters, he would take back all the presents that he had given her. An agreement once reached indicated that the actual wedding ceremony could now take place. This ceremony took the form of the delivery of the wife to her husband. If both belonged to the class of free citizens, the husband veiled his bride in the presence of witnesses and solemnly declared 'she is my wife'.
During the ceremony of betrothal, the girl's future husband poured perfume on her head and brought her presents and provisions. After the wedding, where the couple would live remained the sole issue. Married life might begin with either the bride staying in her father's house or going with her husband to his. In the former case, the husband gave the wife a sum called the dumaki toward the maintenance of the house. If the husband died this contribution remained the widow's property only if the deceased had left neither sons nor brothers.
If, on the other hand, the young couple went to live in the husband's house, the wife brought with her a sherigtu, or dowry. The sherigtu, with the presents the bride had received, remained the inalienable property of her children, and her husband's brothers could not claim it.
Besides these presents, the bride might receive a marriage jointure or nudunnu, a special gift made to her at the time of her engagement. The nudunnu remained her property even if she divorced. Current Clients:. Contact Us Whether you are looking to create a prenuptial agreement, need help resolving a child custody matter, or are looking for moreguidance on LGBT estate planning, we can help. Call or send us a confidential message below. This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.
Final mile: non-profit helps families bring home truckers killed on the job. Load Error. Microsoft and partners may be compensated if you purchase something through recommended links in this article. Found the story interesting? Like us on Facebook to see similar stories. I'm already a fan, don't show this again. Send MSN Feedback. So when an important or significant cause falls into a category of conduct specifically identified in section 8 , courts are authorized to consider it in an alimony determination, even if the at-fault party can point to other potential causes of the divorce.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Ms. Gardner herself acknowledges in her brief, fault in this case could be established only if the court found that Ms.
Because the court did not misapply the law, and its findings are not clearly erroneous, it did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Ms. Gardner] admitted to an inappropriate relationship in at the time of the filing of petition for divorce[,] [which] had not yet become physical. Gardner] had previously been unfaithful and had commenced another inappropriate relationship that [Mr.
Gardner] believed would become a sexual relationship. Gardner] substantially caused the breakup of the marriage relationship. Gardner argues the court erred by characterizing her relationship with another man in as a sexual relationship. But she does not point to any place where the district court suggested that the relationship constituted a sexual relationship.
Rather, the court determined that Ms. Gardner] caused the breakup of the marriage relationship. Gardner fails to show that the court misapplied the law by incorrectly characterizing a non-physical relationship as a sexual relationship. Importantly, she does not deny that she engaged in extramarital affairs in and , so the first element of fault is met. Instead, she argues that the district court clearly erred when it found those affairs to have substantially caused the breakup of the marriage.
We disagree. Gardner argues the court clearly erred for two reasons. But, as we have already discussed, conduct need not be the first, or only, cause of the breakup of the marriage for it to substantially contribute to the divorce. Instead, it need only be an important or significant cause. So the evidence of other sources of contention does not foreclose the possibility that Ms. At trial, Mr. It goes back a long ways. I know that it was real to me in There was additional infidelity that took place in February of and on and on.
The date of her accident, I believe she was with someone who was probably an inappropriate friend as well. This testimony suggests that the extramarital affairs were a significant cause of the divorce, even though there were other areas of contention in their marriage. And Ms. Gardner does not point to any other evidence that would contradict this. Gardner comes to contradicting Mr.
Gardner stayed in the marriage for as long as he did. And this conclusion is not undermined by the fact that he agreed to remain in the marriage once she agreed to go through a formal repentance process through their church.
Gardner also points to Mr. But the most reasonable interpretation of this comment is that Mr. Gardner was very committed until Ms. Gardner points to the events surrounding an accident she suffered in to suggest that this incident, and not the previous affairs, was the true cause of the divorce. But the events surrounding the accident are significant only when viewed in the context of Ms.
After the affairs, Mr. Gardner agreed to remain in the marriage for a time. Gardner discovered that Ms. Although Mr. Gardner admitted that this relationship had not yet become physical, he testified that Ms.
Gardner suggests was the true cause of the divorce. Several months later Mr. Gardner formally filed for divorce. So even though Ms. Under this interpretation, the conduct need not be the only significant cause, or the first significant cause; instead, it need only be significant enough that a reasonable person would conclude that it was an important factor in the divorce. Because evidence supports the conclusion that Ms. The district court was not required to base Ms. For example, in Riley v.
According to the husband, the shortened duration of the alimony award was not short enough. We agreed. Section 8 a requires district courts to consider the financial situations of both spouses as part of its alimony determination. Because the district court determined that Ms. Gardner on this point, but her argument highlights a need to clarify the manner in which district courts may rely on fault in establishing the terms of an alimony award.
But courts should also recognize that not all conduct qualifying as fault under section 8 c should be given equal weight in alimony determinations. So where the fault of the parties is at issue, courts must make a threshold determination of whether the alleged conduct qualifies as fault under section 8 c.
And where the court determines conduct does qualify, it must then determine the role the fault should play in the alimony calculation. It should then make detailed findings regarding the gravity of the harm caused by the fault.
In making these findings, the court should focus on the harm the at-fault conduct caused to the marriage [57] and the other party, along with other equitable factors.
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